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Seminario di ricerca: INCENTIVES, PEER PRESSURE, AND BEHAVIOR PERSISTENCE
Tipologia evento:
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Abstract:
Organizations often introduce temporary incentive programs with a view of establishing long lasting behaviors. Monetary payoffs are awarded upon achievement of team goals, which measure the success of the initiative. In this study, the Author explores whether and how organizational behavior modifications introduced via temporary incentive programs persist beyond the incentive period. In many cases, achieving team goals requires the cooperation of members of the organization external to the team and not eligible to receive the monetary award. The author compares the persistence of behavior modifications between subjects rewarded with a monetary award with subjects that are exposed uniquely to peer pressure. Using hand hygiene performance data from a California hospital, it is found that monetary incentives are associated with higher likelihood and greater magnitude of performance improvements during the incentive period but are relatively short lived, while implicit incentives facilitate a longer persistence of the organizational behavior modification.
Luogo:
Sala Cammarata, I piano, Edificio Centrale, Piazzale Europa 1, Trieste
Promotore:
DEAMS, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Aziendali, Matematiche e Statistiche dell'Università di Trieste
Informazioni:
Relatore: Susanna Gallani, Harvard Business School
Contatti:
Registrazione con mail all'indirizzo andrea.tracogna@deams.units.it
Ultimo aggiornamento: 05-05-2017 - 13:52