Il seminario è stato sospeso nell'ambito delle disposizioni del Rettore e in forza dell’ordinanza contingibile ed urgente n.1 del Ministro della Salute d'intesa con il Presidente della Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia “Misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell’emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-20192”,

Relatrice: Raquel Fonseca, Associate Professor - Département des sciences économiques, École des sciences de la gestion, Université du Québec à Montréal

Abstract

We will build a general equilibrium model with occupational choice, health insurance choice and size decisions. Some agents have the ability to run a business and become employers while others work only for a wage. Agents also make decisions about health insurance. In particular, entrepreneurs have to choose whether to offer health insurance to the employees, and wage workers have to choose whether to work for employers offering health insurance or for employers that do not offer health insurance. The model is calibrated to replicate some key empirical moments of the data. Workers without coverage have a better health status, lower assets and lower income. The model predicts that uninsured workers are predominantly poorer and employed by smaller firms. Furthermore, since young agents are on average healthier and they have lower incomes, the model also predicts that young workers have less coverage than older workers. The pool of insured workers contains workers with lower than average health status. This composition bias follows from the fact that individual health status are not observable and premiums cannot be dependent on individual characteristics.